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Abstract
Much is discussed what would be the ideal position in terms of our ethical treatment with
respect to other forms of life, particularly those that can be discovered in other worlds, in add-
ition to our role in terms of the expansion of terrestrial life in the universe. This represents a
great philosophical challenge, but what if we should make a moral decision in the face of the
inevitable situation of being forced to colonize, for example, Mars? Is there a position in which
we can feel safe to act legitimately? This paper tries to force us into a mental and conceptual
exercise about what can really be worth beyond the concept or the positions we may have and
analyse them in light of the practicality that decision making requires in this problem.
To date we do not know if life exists on Mars, our detection capacity is not strong enough
to perform a sweep that scans both its surface and below it. I could even say that we have no
guarantee or assurance that we have unwittingly annihilated some form of life not possible to
detect even with our current methods. However, evolution has relatively defined paths to
develop, so we could identify them (Levin et al., 2019). This uncertainty generates a series of
problems that can be filled by imagination, as we have registered with Percival Lowell in the
headline of the New York Times entitled ‘Mars inhabited, says Prof. Lowell’ on 30 August
1907. However, since that time until today much has changed in science and technology, in
addition, the philosophy of science and astrobiological ethics have been nourished by new dis-
coveries and advances.
For example, we can now think about how we could colonize Mars, or if it currently har-
bours some form of life. It may be several years before we reach a conclusion of something
certain, but the truth is that if we as species wish to prolong our existence, it will be necessary
to think seriously about how to finally live on Mars. The current technology does not allow it,
but that is not an impediment to perform philosophical exercises in the ethical sense to be able
to consider certain scenarios. In this paper, we assume the following scenario: expanding to
other planetary environments is inevitable, so we must make a decision, or rather a strategy.
Let us say also that in this scenario we have reached the point where we have no choice but
to expand. This paper would not make sense if we had other options besides trying to prolong
terrestrial life, but imagine that we are in a critical situation and we have no other alternative.
How should we proceed? Also, to add an element of drama, consider that the place where we
want to expand already has evidence of some microscopic way of life, or at least has had it, but
due to our position of life or death, we need to expand ourselves. It is a point in which the
point made by Cirkovik (2002) is relevant on a more palpable dimension when he said that
‘the number of potentially viable human lifetimes lost per a century of postponing of the
onset of galactic colonization is 5 × 1046’. Unlike the consequentialist ethic of Baum (2016),
where we can still think of the multiple effects, pros and cons of settling on Mars, in this work
we only have one option: expand or perish. This represents a kind of mental experiment,
although this has its limitations as will be seen. In any case, the administration of this paper is
as follows: first, we will talk about mental experiments in this scenario, then a discussion regarding
a possible discovery of life on Mars and, finally, a reflection on the intrinsic value of non-terrestrial
life under the ratiocentrism perspective, that is to say: ‘the view that the possession of reason is the
primary means by which we differentiate entities having moral’ (Smith, 2014).
On mental experiments and astrobiology
Mental experiments help us to raise problems that we do not normally have opportunities or
ways to perform empirically, either due to technological limitations or due to their mathem-
atical nature. Essentially, they do not look for a solution, but they do set up possible scenarios
to exercise critical sense. Einstein’s thought experiments (trains travelling at light speed) and
Schrödinger (the cat and the box) were adequate to represent a problematic situation at a
mathematician and counterfactual level but never have been materialized (Sorensen, 1992).
This is important if we want to understand a situation that is difficult for us to present.
However, mental experiments in ethics are not necessarily based on mathematics, they belong
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to the empirical world. On the other hand, they are not necessar-
ily counterfactual situations and are more related to our daily
experiences, although at a more complex level. A mental experi-
ment that tries to manifest itself at the ethical level, for example,
is that of the violinist connected to us without having even con-
sulted us and that it depends on us whether he should continue
to live (Thomson, 1971). This thought experiment is used to
discuss the case of abortion. However, the differences here
between a fetus and a person are categorical and the debate
between whether a fetus is a human being or not comes into
play with this debate. The use of mental experiments in ethical
situations is limited by the very situation that seeks to problem-
atize. In fact, the solutions can be given by consensus or be subject
to vote, as could be the case of abortion, so that the mental experi-
ment plays a role to a certain extent, that is, to the point at which
a decision is made.
In the case of mathematical mental experiments, this does not
happen, Schrodinger’s cat remains in a situation in which no vote
or consensus can fully define it. On the other hand, in the mental
ethical experiments, especially in the astrobiological ones, it can
be a matter of time until we make a decision about colonization.
It can help us to problematize about what action we should take,
we might even never reach a definitive solution, but as it was said,
a decision will have to be made in our special scenario. What
decision will it be? No ethical mental experiment is so strong to
go so far, but its usefulness will be in giving us all possible solu-
tions to help us evaluate which of them is the one we will choose.
After all, as mentioned by Milligan (2015) ‘But where experience
cannot guide us, something more imaginative may be required, at
least until we know better’. In this sense our critical exercise gives
us the necessary help to be able to make an argued choose.
Why Mars as the scene of our analysis?
The planet Mars is taken as a reference since it represents an
interesting and exemplary case to be able to raise this problematic,
in addition to the potential that it has to terraform it and because
previously it has already been the object of moral consideration
(McKay, 1990). In the writing done by Mckay (1990), we find a
support of if it is morally viable to colonize Mars and if it is,
under what circumstances. He makes a summary of environmen-
tal ethics to extrapolate to an astrobiological ethic. In fact, his pro-
posal at the end of his writing is that just before venturing to
Mars, we must amplify the environmental ethic we have. The
summary that makes the environment ethics and its principles
are the following: anti-humanism, wise stewardship and intrinsic
worth. Of the three, he says that only the first would not be so
viable for a possible colonization directed to Mars since it means
that we leave intact and reduce the human impact on nature. In
our extreme case scenario that we have to go to Mars, this option
would also be discarded, or in any case, it would be at a lower
level of relevance. We would not want to intervene in every pos-
sible corner where there it could be Martian life because this
would really mean an interventionism that would even harm
our scientific interest to study other forms of life. The second
principle, which consists in knowing how to wisely manage the
resources of nature is, in words of McKay (1990): ‘It is probable
the only fundamental principle of ecological ethics that has uni-
versal appeal. This universal appeal may stem from the clear
human need for the goods and services that nature can provide
and the desire to maintain these benefits’ (p. 190). If we want
to venture to Mars and if it is already inhabited, then this
principle would help us to know how to balance and organize
the presence of non-terrestrial and terrestrial life. Finally, the
intrinsic worth principle gives value to everything that makes
up the biosphere. However, if it were applied it would not be pos-
sible to move to Mars if it had life.
So from what we see the second principle would be viable for
our context. Number one and three are discarded for their radic-
alism. McKay (1990) also tells us that if Mars does not have life, it
is our imperative to improve it to start to have it and if it had life,
we would have to do everything possible to study it, avoid putting
it in danger and promote its development. It is at this point that
we take a different position disagreeing with McKay because in
our scenario we know that there is life and it is imperative to col-
onize the red planet. If there is life and we need to inhabit Mars,
the questions would be: to what extent to colonize it? (a), the
whole planet? (b), should we modify the atmosphere or limit our-
selves to domes? (c). These are very daring questions because they
presuppose the existence of the technology capable of doing it, but
sooner or later they may come true. The level of colonization
should be the one that allows us to subsist and coexist with
other forms of life (a); possibly not the entire planet, unless the
conditions demand it, since doing so could put the present
Martian life at risk (b); it is derived from the above that in prin-
ciple the domes, then evaluate the possibility of terraforming
entirely (c).
How to act in response to the discovery of microbial life on
Mars?
If we want to think of a way of acting in this type of situation, Race
and Randolph (2002) carry out an analysis and recommendations
about an ethical theoretical framework to know how we should
proceed if a non-intelligent type of extraterrestrial (ET) life is
discovered. To summarize their idea, they propose the following
steps:
(1) If evidence of ET life is detected, do no harm. Avoid intrusive
action until full consultation can be made.
(2) If presumed evidence of ET life is detected, seek to verify and
confirm that the life form is truly ET.
(3) Prior to the public announcement, confirm the discovery by
independent observations with research colleagues and insti-
tution elsewhere.
(4) If the discovery is credible, inform the United Nations (UN)
and appropriate government agencies (Race and Randolph,
2002).
As for the first step, in our context, we have the haste to colonize
other planetary environments, but we will do everything possible
to avoid some kind of damage. However, the query of whether to
go or not is already discounted and also we assume that there is
ET life non-intelligent, so we skip step two and three. And on step
four, in our context people and nations already know it. All of
these steps are appropriate in a context in which the discovery
is potential. Those are steps in a situation where we have time
without feeling limited by dedicating attention and postponing
our future colonization, which is ethically correct in that case.
But in this paper, we are forcing the conditions either for survival
or for some reason that forces us to begin to populate another
planetary environment, we must think about what to do after hav-
ing passed these points. The other following elements presented
by the authors are:
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(5) All data should be made available to the scientific
community.
(6) Protect and preserve the ET life form.
(7) No further missions or activities prior to international
consultation.
(8) Continue to review and update procedures and policies
(Race and Randolph, 2002).
Case five should be respected in our scenario. While it is true we
have the imperative to go out and expand in the universe, that
does not mean that we have to hide information from people.
No matter how urgent we are, everything must be kept as trans-
parent as possible and accessible to the entire scientific commu-
nity also. This is a journey of humanity and life on Earth, not
of a small group of people with selfish interests involved. It is
an opportunity to do things differently and avoid falling into
any kind of corruption that is like a cancer for human relation-
ships. The number six is also applicable for us, we must look
for a coexistence that must be carried out in a peaceful way pro-
tecting and preserving ET life that we have to deal with (which in
our case is not – intelligent). And as a branch of five and six, all
activity related to it must be consulted by international media to
ensure the interest of humanity. Finally, the eight reveals the a
posteriori nature of astrobioethics (Chon-Torres, 2018a); that is,
we do not have previous experience in this type of situation, so
having them will help us to provide feedback and have the neces-
sary heuristics to continue optimizing our ethical framework
around the colonization of other worlds.
From all that we could say that if there is proven life on Mars,
the succession of events could be the following, in a simplified
and enumerated way:
(1) Safeguard all relevant area for the study of Martian life
(Cockell and Horneck, 2004).
(2) Study Martian life forms including some way of extracting
samples from it without harm.
(3) In parallel, continue the exploration of the red planet in
places that have not been done before.
(4) Ensure that the following landings do not compromise
local life.
(5) Landing with people in the places allowed and duly studied to
avoid some form of contamination against Martian life.
(6) Development of human colonies and promotion the protec-
tion of places with presence of Martian life.
We could argue that if ET life has intrinsic value, we could expose
different positions with respect to it, which would give us a the-
oretical framework to be able to maintain a position. In fact,
the work of Baum (2016) makes an interesting recount of all
the utilitarian approaches at a theoretical level. However, in our
context, we need to define what we will have to do.
The proposal that I have presented would include safeguarding
the ‘rights’ of the Martian life to exist, that is, having an intrinsic
value. And why not? Every form of life follows Darwinian
mechanics and seeks to develop, insofar as it has that ‘interest’
has a value in itself. A separate question is whether the human
being wants to respect it. In life on Earth, this happens partially,
we do not always respect the right to exist of other species (espe-
cially in the case of animals that have a type of cognitive process
more developed than just insects). It also has to do with the fact of
the abundance or scarcity of the way of life in question. We do not
hesitate when we wash our hands with soap and water to
eliminate bacteria, but if those bacteria were a Martian way of
life we would have another treatment, because once they are
erased, we may never find another one. Besides, it would be a
way of life that can help us understand what we are with respect
to the universe. Here we agree with McKay (2009) to consider that
Martian life has value in itself for the fact that it is Martian. The
bacteria that we eliminate when washing our hands are abundant
and we know that we can acquire more. Therefore, an interesting
differential factor here is that of the unique quantity and quality.
In addition, an environmental ethic would be differentiated from
an astrobiological ethics or astrobioethic by this same argument.
Astrobiological ethics will be biocentric in some sense, but it
does not prevent us from satisfying our academic curiosity
about it or issues of survival. It is not easy to determine where
we are going to be more anthropocentric and less of it depending
on these special circumstances.
But continuing with the previous proposal on the six simpli-
fied points, it would satisfy our interest to understand its nature.
Besides, that it would not prevent us from continuing with our
expansion in the universe, which is inevitable if we think in
terms of survival (and here I am omitting a lot of debate in
between about whether or not we should colonize Mars). This
same scenario could apply for the Moon or any other non-
terrestrial environment achievable for humanity, also if the life-
form we find shares the same origins with us.
At this point the position we show is closer to the ratiocentr-
ism, which considers that the moral weight falls on the rational
quality of the being in question, to differentiate it from anthropo-
centrism, which emphasizes the human being only more valuable
only because it is human. In the case of the ratiocentrism,
although it is true that we only have as an example the human
being, this does not mean that it is limited to it, but it leaves
open the possibility that other beings are included in case they
are identified (I omit the word ‘discovered’ on purpose since it
would imply a strong anthropocentric influence.) Ratiocentrism
helps us to realize that we rational beings have the opportunity to
administer and treat other living beings in the best way possible,
whether they are from Earth or not and that being rational does
not give us the right to abuse other forms of life (Smith, 2009).
The reason why I assume the position that human beings go to
Mars or another planetary environment in this context is that
when we are facing a situation of conditioned decision we are pri-
oritizing aspects above others intentionally. If it were another
scenario we could put ourselves in different situations and argue
about whether it is necessary or not that human beings should go
to another planet (Milligan, 2015), or if we should wait some pru-
dential time to do it (Chon-Torres, 2018c).
Does that mean that one species has more value than another?
Could the egalitarianism of species and location be applied as pro-
posed by Baum (2016)? The egalitarianism of species and location
tell us that all species have intrinsic value no matter what species
it is or where it is located. This is ideal in concept and is designed
for an astrobiological ethics, but if we consider it dispassionately it
is not very viable for our purpose. The value of Martian life will
have value in itself, but it will not have the same level of value as
a terrestrial bacterium under the proposed conditions. Even on
Earth, we can say that being alive has value in itself, but this would
mean that we must change our way of life in a radical way, like
how to modify our diet and how we relate to all forms of terres-
trial life. It does not seem that for the moment something like this
is going to happen soon, even though we are suffering from
climate change due to the excessive pollution generated by us.
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On the other hand, an argument that values life more by its
location in space would not make much sense if it is limited to
having it only physically being on Earth. If an astronaut goes
out into space, it is not without value. Rather, it has value because
it has terrestrial origins and because it has human dignity. It has
value for the fact of being human, in addition, it is a terrestrial
being. The forms of life, wherever they come from, have value
by themselves, it is true and if it is of Martian origin, it will
have an additional value (it does not mean superior), because
being an ET life form would respond to our millennial question
of whether we are alone or not in the universe. We see that devel-
oping an ethic that focuses on astrobiology is not going to be lim-
ited only to a position or a theoretical type of Frankeistein, but it
will be a position that manages to connect with the different inter-
ests and values that we give to life both on Earth and other
environments.
McKay and Marinova (2001) make an interesting observation
about the implications and usefulness of the principles of the
Deep Ecology of Naess and Sessions (1984) in relation to the
life in the universe. The first of the principles says that non-
human life has value in itself independently of any human use
and the second that the diversity and richness of this diversity
of life forms are a value in themselves. However, this is to some
extent evident in considerations of possible Martian life forms.
What should call us more attention for decision making is what
is pointed out in the third principle, which tells us that except
for survival issues, the human being can not diminish that wealth
and diversity of life forms. In the scenario in which we set out,
that of having to colonize Mars, this third principle would have
to be applied when risking to generate some kind of damage to
Martian life. And it does not matter how safe we are that we
have established plots of land where we can land and settle, or
promote some form of terrestrial life, there is always the difficulty
of not being totally sure of avoiding some kind of collateral dam-
age, at least with the current technology. The caveat provided by
the third principle of Deep Ecology is the moral option that we
could need to be able to establish us on another planet.
We cannot conclude with complete certainty that ‘this must be
the case’ since this will require the collaboration and participation
of different disciplines that conclude in a common moral frame-
work. What we do in this case is to force a situation where we
already have to make a decision, but without ceasing to think
that this will indeed have changes or variations at the very
moment of the emergence of the real problem (Chon-Torres,
2018a, 2018b, 2018c).
Conclusion
Examining some of the possible ways to make a colonization of
Mars viable based on current ethical assumptions involves taking
risks. That is to say, it means that we have to launch ourselves as a
bet to a situation in which human life depends on this decision
making. It is not easy if we consider that we could be compromising
local life, but we can try to draw a strategy that allows us to coexist
in a peaceful way. Ratiocentrism is a fundamental basis for
perceiving us with the moral legitimacy of being able to wisely man-
age and organize the necessary resources for life. In addition, in
Deep Ecology we also have a caveat when it tells us that except
for vital issues, non-human life must be respected and in our case
it is like that, if we extrapolate it to Martian life. Finally, the deci-
sions we make in the real moment can differ considerably from
all our moral theorizing, which is why it has been important to
force ourselves to think about what we owe or how we should con-
ceive an inevitable colonization.
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